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Abstract
Alliancing is a relatively new construction project delivery method receiving increasing interest 
globally while also eliciting many questions about its effectiveness. That is why its operating 
logic should be clarified beyond the currently existing general views. Correspondingly, this 
paper aims to define the means and mechanisms which influence the capacity of alliancing 
to produce value for money. The work establishes the interlaced impact chains between 
formal basic solutions of alliancing and the key result areas defining the value-for-money 
ratio. This is made by focussing on a single alliance project and its procedural solutions and 
experiences. The case project of the study was an urban road tunnel under a city structure and 
the impact chains were explored by interviewing all eight members of the alliance leadership 
team covering all contracting parties. The two-stage personal interviews were conducted in 
accordance with the systematic modelling procedure resulting in eight cognitive maps which 
were then combined into a group map. The resulting model included around one hundred 
interlinked concepts initially, but was streamlined for the paper. Accordingly, alliancing offers 
a concrete framework which gives better than normal chances of success in the case of 
complex, challenging projects fraught with much uncertainty. Many diverse basic alliance 
solutions/features contribute to success, while each feature also seems to strengthen the 
impact of the others. This suggests that, at its best, pure project alliance is not only a coherent 
but also a holistic solution to challenging projects.
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Introduction
Demanding construction projects, their conditions and input data are fraught with great 
uncertainty. The numerous designers and implementers, many interest groups, technical 
challenges and systems and linkages to existing infrastructure, especially in the case of 
horizontal infrastructure projects, increase their complexity. Traditional project delivery 
methods based on a transactional approach and a strict distribution of responsibilities have 
been found to be poorly suited for projects of this type. The uncertainty is reflected in extensive 
risk contingencies while the primary interest of the parties is to safeguard their own interests. 
Moreover, the possibilities from combining versatile expertise and collaborative work are not 
seized.
On the other hand, in Project Alliance (alliance contracting) designers, contractors and 
the project owner form a joint project organisation and work in open collaboration. All 
benefit from the success of the project entity and there is neither need nor opportunity for 
company-specific sub-optimisation. Moreover, alliance contracting makes effective use of 
the early co-operation of the actors by integrating versatile expertise for the development 
of the project solution. Thereby it is believed to enable better innovative development and 
more effective project implementation than traditional delivery methods in challenging 
projects.
The impact of the procedures followed in alliancing on the success of projects is not yet 
fully clear and undisputed. The presented arguments and causal relationships often remain 
independent general principles, although the influential factors and impact chains are very 
diverse. Therefore, those who value traditional delivery methods find it hard to believe that 
refraining from pure price competition and risk transfer can improve project implementation 
from the viewpoint of the owner. As a result, the functional connection between the various 
alliance principles and results should be assessed and clarified in addition to comparing the 
results achieved by alliancing to those produced by other delivery methods. Ultimately, only 
the conformity of functional arguments and achieved results proves proper functioning. 
However, in a world of individual projects it is very hard to make indisputable comparisons 
of results which emphasises the importance of theoretical examination focussing on causal 
relationships. Yet, no systematic and comprehensive description of the value-creation 
mechanisms of alliancing exists.
Thus, this study aims to determine the means and mechanisms of alliancing that impact 
its ability to provide value for money. It intends to outline the impact chains between the 
individual basic solutions of alliancing and the key result areas determining the value-for-
money ratio (cost-efficiency, schedule, quality, etc.); basic solutions consist of selections 
regarding formal organisation, process and conditions of contract. However, the impact 
chains are not independent but closely interconnected. Thus, the entire impact network 
must be identified to create an overall picture of the value-creation mechanisms of 
alliancing.
The research focusses mainly on a single alliance project and its practices; broadly speaking 
on so-called ‘pure’ alliance. External factors have been excluded from impact assessments (e.g. 
market conditions and political decision making). Impact chains are studied by interviewing 
alliance leadership team members using a systematic modelling method (so-called cognitive 
maps). The conducted interviews were two-stage personal interviews but their results are 
presented as a combined view.
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The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly introduces project alliancing, 
with main emphasis on the review of literature about how the alliance provides value for 
money. Then the study methods and the alliance case project on which the study is based, are 
introduced, after which the next section (Compiled cognitive impact map) shows the results, 
i.e. the streamlined group map of the executives of the case project. The paper ends with a 
discussion and conclusions.
Present knowledge
The project alliance system evolved from the need to improve the implementation of 
demanding investment projects (see Ross, 2003; Lahdenperä, 2012). In such projects involving 
much uncertainty (due to, for instance, new technology and project conditions or interfaces), 
risk premiums and/or adversarial and opportunistic behaviour characteristics of traditional 
contracting would lead to an uneconomical result from the viewpoint of the owner (see e.g. 
Sweeney, 2009; Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Bajari, Horton and Tadelis, 2014). The low bid 
syndrome especially can be recognised as a major determinant behind the customary adversarial 
behaviour leading to failure (Weston and Gibson, 1993; Scott, 2001, Stehbens, Wilson and 
Skitmore, 1999; Nicholson, 1991, Loraine, 1994) while sequential involvement of the parties 
does not allow mutual exchange of information and collaboration for the benefit of the project.
Project alliance is a project delivery method (typically) based on a joint contract between 
the key actors to a project (owner, designer, constructor), where the parties assume joint 
responsibility for the design and construction of the project to be implemented through a joint 
organisation, and where the actors bear both positive and negative risks related to the project 
jointly and observe the principles of information accessibility and unanimous decision-making in 
pursuing close collaboration (Lahdenperä, 2009). The system enables the owner to combine 
broad, versatile expertise to benefit the project and to harmonise the actors’ interests regarding 
reaching the aims of the project and, therefore, particularly to improve the economic aspects 
of risky projects. An authoritative introduction to alliancing is given by Australian national 
guidelines (DIRD, 2015) since the system in its current form is above all an Australian 
innovation applied in hundreds of projects so far (DTF, 2006; 2009).
The alliance contract has been the subject of active research since the first projects that 
used it (e.g. Clegg et al., 2002; Ross, 2003; Walker and Hampson, 2003; Hauck et al., 2004). 
These and many later project-specific case studies (e.g. Jefferies, Rowlinson and Schubert, 
2012; Walker and Jacobsson, 2014; Morwood, Scott and Pitcher, 2008; Ibrahim et al., 
2016b) focussed on principles of operation while also trying to assess the results achievable 
by alliancing. Belief in the excellence of the system is strong in general, but a systematic and 
comprehensive description of the value-for-money creation mechanisms of project alliancing 
has not been produced so far.
Also as concerns assessment of performance, the study is mainly qualitative except for 
occasional cost savings estimates. Walker, Harley and Mills, (2015) and Sweeney (2009) are 
among the rare studies based on a broad stock of projects and exact data. The results speak for 
the excellence of alliancing as earlier studies. DTF (2009) also examines project outcome data 
but mars the otherwise positive picture by questioning alliancing based on non-price selection. 
The significance of the underlying project-specific challenges and conditions, however, remains 
unclear (cf. Rooney, 2009) while the view tends to be contrary to more dominant insight (e.g. 
Manley and Chen, 2016).
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Alliance research has also been conducted from the viewpoints of various disciplines. One 
starting point are formal contractual solutions and their impacts, such as the no-dispute clause 
(Rowlinson et al., 2006) and sharing of risks (Love et al., 2011; Laan, Voordijk and Dewulf, 
2011). Other major themes are development of the parties’ co-operation relations (Davis and 
Love, 2011; Ibrahim, Costello and Wilkinson, 2016a), the alliance’s operating culture (Walker 
and Lloyd-Walker, 2014; Lloyd-Walker, Mills and Walker, 2014), and the significance of trust 
in the organisation’s operations (Strahorn, Gajendran and Brewer, 2013; She, Doloi and Mills, 
2012). Thus, human factors and their contribution to success are also strongly emphasised 
along with the formal organisation, the letter of the agreement and the phases and tasks of the 
process.
The alliance theme has also generated much doctoral research (Davis, 2005; Davies, 2008; 
Sweeney, 2009; MacDonald, 2011; Chen, 2013; Vilasini, 2014; She, 2014; Ibrahim, 2014). 
Related study in general has focussed on finding the success factors of the alliance ( Jefferies, 
Brewer and Gajendran, 2014; Mistry and Davis, 2009). These studies also emphasise the 
characteristics of the alliance which some other research efforts have attempted to define 
(Chen and Manley, 2014; Walker and Lloyd-Walker, 2015; Chen et al., 2012). From the 
viewpoint of this study, the contribution of literature has probably been the greatest on 
the level of alliance principles where it offers an unambiguous knowledge base of the 
characteristics of alliancing.
In general, the presentation of alliance research is pronouncedly verbal and modelling has 
only been applied to the project process (MacDonald, 2011; MacDonald, Walker and Moussa, 
2013), albeit from the viewpoint of ensuring value creation. Although the published works 
are meritorious overall, the picture provided by them is unclear from the viewpoint of formal 
modelling, which means that it is difficult to establish an overall view of the value-creation 
mechanisms of an alliance based on them. Naturally, the presented review is only an example, 
but it builds on wider mapping.
Research method
RESEARCH APPROACH
The value-creation mechanisms of alliancing were examined based on the experiences from 
a single alliance project. Thus, the results were achieved primarily by means of trying to 
understand, interpret and evaluate a case. Case study is well suited to research areas where 
existing knowledge is insufficient from the viewpoint of goal setting (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
and we are seeking answers to ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions related to contemporary phenomena 
(Yin, 2014).
The data of the case study were collected through expert interviews. The experts were senior 
executives of the alliance leadership team providing leadership and governance to the alliance 
while not participating in the everyday management of the project. All eight members of the 
leadership team, at least one expert from each partner organisation, were interviewed. Each 
member was interviewed separately to provide as comprehensive and authentic a picture as 
possible (cf. Gray, Zanre and Gray, 2014: emphasis on distinct aspects; risks of group dynamics 
at joint events). Use of experts from a single project ensured the common experiential 
background of interviewees which enhanced the creation of a coherent view concerning a 
theme allowing several interpretations. It also eliminated guesswork about the variations of 
alliancing since the interviews focussed on procedural solutions of the target project. This is 
important because alliancing can take many forms.
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There were two rounds of interviews to ensure better mapping of a range of factors 
influencing value creation at separate phases. The first interview was conducted at the 
beginning of the alliance development phase and the second one after the alliance had 
determined that readiness to launch the implementation phase existed. There was a one year 
interval between the rounds of interviews. Individual interviews lasted on average two hours 
(80–140 min.) and took a total time of about 30 hours.
Data collection was supported using a formal method of description. The views 
of interviewees were collected into so-called cognitive maps that describe the process 
characteristics (concepts) and the impact relationships between them (causal links; linkages). 
The interviews were also recorded for later analysis. This verbal argumentation complemented 
the comprehensive examination in the original report (Lahdenperä, 2015a) and enabled 
thorough content analysis which was a prerequisite for integration and streamlining of the 
maps without erroneous interpretations.
The starting point of the interviews were the seven key result areas (to be listed below 
in ‘The case project’ section) presented by the owner in the request for proposals which are 
normal in alliance projects (cf. Walker, Harley and Mills, 2015). Characteristics describing 
the activity and applied solutions, that were believed to have had an impact on the key result 
areas (outcome concepts; heads), were sought initially in the interviews. Then, reasons for or 
enablers of the emerging characteristics were sought until it was possible to start dealing with 
the structural and formal solutions (initial concepts; tails) instead of e.g. viewpoints related to 
attitudes and culture.
The interviewee could see a developing map in front of him throughout the interview to 
ensure the validity of the forming cognitive map. Factors deemed fit for inclusion (concepts to 
be modelled) were not predetermined or standardised (as is sometimes done when aiming for 
a combination model) but all issues considered important by the interviewee were included to 
promote building of the most comprehensive picture possible (cf. Gray, Zanre and Gray, 2014). 
In other words, the interviewees had to identify the concepts for the model based on their 
experience.
The interviewees were also to evaluate the strength of the impacts of identified concepts to 
allow later evaluation of the significance of several factors (initial concepts) and performance 
expectations (outcome concepts) quantitatively. They were particularly reminded of the fact 
that the impacts can also be negative (detrimental) and such items should also be expressed 
when putting together the cognitive map.
In the second round of interviews, modelling was continued based on the result of the first 
round. The map was complemented with new observations and experiences and the weights 
describing the strength of the impact relationships were balanced for the entire impact 
network.
COGNITIVE MAPPING
A cognitive map is generally a formal, visual representation of an individual’s ‘mental model’ 
construct consisting of nodes and arrows depicting the relationships between them (Eden, 
2004; Gray, Zanre and Gray, 2014). The maps are typically hierarchical, proceeding mainly 
from causes to consequences (as all those of this study). Traditional cognitive maps do 
not identify differences in the strength of relationships between nodes (except as positive/
negative). On the other hand, so-called fuzzy cognitive mapping represents a procedure 
where the degree of influence is identified in the simplest form by a given numerical value 
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(Kosko, 1986). In this study, the influence could strengthen (+) or weaken (–) the characteristic 
depicted by the receiving concept while the strength of the relationships between concepts was 
assigned an integer value, the absolute value being 1 (low), 2 (significant) or 3 (crucial).
Eight parallel cognitive maps were made into a single comprehensive social cognitive 
map or group map which, despite its name, does not refer to a map prepared jointly by the 
group (Özesmi and Özesmi, 2004; Gray, Zanre and Gray, 2014). When putting together the 
combination model, concepts with the same content were combined so that the resulting 
combined concept retained all linkages to concepts that would remain original (not combined 
ones) unchanged, and the strengths between two pairs of combined concepts were added up to 
produce a new impact value (see Kosko, 1988).
Table 1 presents indicators of individual experts’ cognitive maps and the group map 
produced by combining them. Comparison of the indicators to those of maps, prepared 
as part of other studies (Özesmi and Özesmi, 2004), seems to suggest that the scope of 
individual maps corresponds at least to the general level attained using the method. On the 
other hand, the time spent preparing the maps of this study has been greater than in the case 
of the reference values which gives reason to expect thoroughly thought-out descriptions of 
mechanisms.
The maps were also analysed by a very straightforward calculation method. For instance, in 
‘top-down’ calculation evaluating the significance of alliance characteristics (initial concepts), 
each relationship directly linked to key result areas (outcome concepts) was first assigned 
a relative weight equal to the value of the link in relation to the sum of all impacts linked 
to outcome concepts. Then, the map was calculated against the impact direction so that in 
each case the sum of the weights of all outbound relationships of an intermediary concept, 
which constitutes the weight of the intermediary concept, was divided between the incoming 
relationships of the concept in proportion to their original values. The weight of an initial 
concept is the sum of the weights of its outgoing linkages. ‘Bottom-up’ calculation followed a 
similar logic, but the direction of calculation was the opposite. These calculations were run on 
both the combination model (original group map) and separately on each expert’s individual 
model (cognitive map), and in the latter case the results were calculated as an average of the 
individual calculations.
Decision Explorer software was used in modelling the maps although the quantitative 
approach required developing a separate Excel application. Decision Explorer enables several 
types of map analyses but they were used only to verify the quantitative analysis (for the part 
of network structure) since the software does not identify differences in impact strengths 
Table 1 Indicators of the cognitive maps prepared in the study
Expert-specific maps Combined map
[No.] Min. Max. Mean Std Dev  Original Streamlined
Outcome concepts 7 7 7,0 0.0 7 4
Intermediary concepts 11 20 14.6 3.1 80 49
Initial concepts 3 7 5.0 1.5 14 14
Concepts, total 21 34 26.6 4.2 101 67
Linkages 33 58 44.8 9.0 296 153
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(see Decision Explorer, 2002). The results of this phase are presented comprehensively in an 
industry report (Lahdenperä, 2015a) that includes also the original combination model and 
the key interview quotes.
Then, the work was continued by streamlining the model (for this paper). The original 
combination model was put together without any content changes, and is partly unclear, 
since different experts perceive things differently. Therefore, all related concepts could not 
be integrated in the original model serving as the basis of the quantitative analysis. In the 
streamlining stage, these related concepts were also integrated. At the same time, many 
short-cuts by interviewees were eliminated whenever it was apparent that the actual impact 
chain runs through other concepts and has already been described in the model as it is. This 
was done closely in accordance with the content analysis of interviews but the weightings of 
impact relationships (numerical) were no longer clear which meant that their description had 
to be abandoned. Yet, creation of an understandable overall picture required compaction.
THE CASE PROJECT
The case project of the study was the Tampere Road Tunnel implemented by an alliance. It 
involved relocating a stretch of Highway 12 (which ran along the shore of Lake Näsijärvi 
above ground) in a pair of tunnels in the centre of the City of Tampere (Alliance Executive 
Team, 2013). New road and street arrangements, relocation of utilities/services networks, and 
interchanges at both ends of the tunnel were also part of the project (4.2 km of highways, 
4.0 km of streets, seven new bridges). Both directions of travel have their separate 2.3 km 
tunnels with three lanes (one being a safety lane). Several passageways with fire and smoke 
compartmentation were built between the tunnels, and traffic control and guidance systems 
played a significant role in the project. The initial road-plan phase cost estimate was MEUR 
185 (ELY, 2011; March 2011 price level) while an updated (due to indexing and missing 
items) estimate of MEUR 204 (at May 2013 price level; i.e. at the time the target cost was set) 
offers a more appropriate point of comparison.
All in all, we are speaking of a demanding project that was fraught with much uncertainty 
and numerous constraints which is why project alliance was applied in the project. The owner’s 
view that guided project preparation was that smooth co-operation between the partners 
would allow achieving better than conventional results since a diverse project enables searching 
for different alternative solutions (FTA, 2012b). The project’s request for proposals and road 
plan defined its technical requirements and goals. The owner also set the following key result 
areas for the implementation (FTA, 2012b):
	 •	 Cost-efficiency	(cost-effective	implementation	that	yields	value	for	money).
	 •	 Schedule	(commissioned	on	schedule,	optimised	implementation	phase	duration).
	 •	 Environment	(minor	environmental	impacts	from	construction	and	the	end-product).
	 •	 Quality	(excellent	quality	of	design	and	construction).
	 •	 Safety	(excellent	project	safety).
	 •	 Traffic	(least	possible	disturbance;	uninterrupted	usability	on	completion).
	 •	 Image	(favourable	public	image).
The alliance procurement started in December 2011. The service providers were chosen in 
a competition which required the candidates to have both the competence to design and 
construct the project (i.e. consortium selection). Accordingly, the participants themselves 
had to form teams that took part in the competition, typically as groups of companies. 
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In the stage-wise process, selection was eventually based on capability and fee (company-
level overhead plus expected profit; see Lahdenperä, 2015b). The chosen parties signed 
the development agreement in July 2012. Two public owners, two design offices and one 
construction company constituted the alliance partners.
Development-phase planning (to determine the project solution and corresponding target 
cost), which ended the following June, led to the signing of an alliance implementation 
contract in October 2013 (after some political wrangling; see Vainio, 2015). At that time, 
the road section was expected to be ready for use in May 2017, and the finishing work was 
to end about a year later; the key result areas became part of the incentive scheme of the 
agreement, meaning that the compensation of service providers was partly performance-based 
(Alliance Executive Team, 2013). The target cost was MEUR 180 (at May 2013 price level). 
Subsequently, the tunnel was completed and opened for traffic in November 2016, with some 
finishing works still to be completed.
Compiled cognitive impact map
STRUCTURE OF THE MAP
The cognitive impact model created by the study describing the value-creation 
mechanisms of the alliance is analysed in Figures 1-4. Figure 1 shows the outcome 
concepts derived from the key result areas (in blue) as well as all the intermediary 
concepts directly linked to key result areas (in red). Generally, intermediary concepts are 
ones with both inbound and outbound relationships while outcome concepts only have 
inbound relationships depicted by arrows. Thus, arrows describe a relationship between 
two concepts acting in the direction of the arrow and strengthening the characteristic of 
an inbound concept since all relationships are positive (while outcome concepts described 
by neutral terms refer here also to remarkable success with respect to the described 
characteristic). Four of the seven original key result areas are shown combined since the 
underlying factors are much the same.
Figures 2-4 show views of the rest of the impact network. Each figure presents more closely 
interrelated initial concepts depicting the formal characteristic of the alliance (in green; with 
only outbound relationships) as well as the chain of intermediary concepts leading from 
Figure 1 Outcome concepts and factors contributing to their successful achievement
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them to outcome concepts (in yellow excl. concepts common with Figure 1 in red). In the 
compilation of Figures 2-4, the starting point was that, besides the concepts, also all impact 
relationships (arrows) are shown at least once in parallel with both of their adjoining concepts, 
and that none of the impact relationships are presented only in connection with the linkages 
Figure 2 Rationality of selection
Figure 3 Effectiveness of development
Figure 4 Efficiency of implementation
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between concepts presented in different figures indicated by short dashed arrows and related 
concept numbers (where the inbound impact is depicted under each concept and the outbound 
one above it). Therefore, some intermediary concepts are shown in the series of pictures several 
times, unlike the outcome and initial concepts that appear only once.
IMPACT MECHANISMS
Formal characteristics concerning the alliance organisation, process and conditions of contract 
and their impact on the alliance’s capacity to yield value for money are explained below by 
three model views (Figs. 2-4). The views are based roughly on the alliance’s phases although 
especially the last presented factors impact project implementation even earlier. A written 
presentation complements the model views although such a compressed presentation cannot, 
unfortunately, fully depict all the insight included in the comprehensive model.
Selection phase (Figure 2)
Forming a project organisation mainly through capability-based competition (Concept 54) 
ensures that capable and development-oriented resources can be committed to the project. 
Thereby the problems often ensuing from full price competition affecting implementation 
and the resulting negative development trend in general can be avoided. To succeed 
in capability-based competition, service providers also prepare and form teams before 
actual selection starts, which, for its part, improves the chances of success and accelerates 
launching of effective work. As concerns team formation, this is true especially in the 
case of consortium selection where the proposer must have resources for both design and 
construction, which means that the companies seek partners already before registering for 
the competition. When there is sufficient supply, such team formation by service providers 
themselves (55) creates the most favourable conditions for finding the most efficient 
compositions to implement a project.
A key element of capability-based competition is selection workshops where the tendering 
consortium’s qualifications, ability to co-operate and innovativeness are determined by a variety 
of tasks (not merely based on documents), even by a psychologist’s statement. Team formation 
with the owner organisation starts at the same time, which allows combining distinct types 
of expertise for the benefit of the project. Moreover, interactive selection (56), which is partly 
based on the workshop procedure, improves together with other process properties, the 
possibility of finding development ideas and functioning rules of the game since, in addition 
to the possibility of improving the cost estimate and the project solution, the rules of 
implementation, risk sharing and project scope definition are examined together with several 
competitors. Functioning rules of the game, numerous development ideas and a development-
oriented organisation that integrates expertise, provide a good starting point for project work 
after the selection phase.
Development phase (Figure 3)
Service provider selection is followed by signing of the alliance’s development-phase 
agreement, which launches joint development without delay, since earlier input of resources in 
team formation and interactive selection have created favourable conditions for co-operation 
and clear rules of the game. At the same time, early involvement of contractor (57) ensures 
access to cost and constructability information and thereby also immediate feedback for design 
process management. A capable team, better resourcing and overall competence attained by 
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combining different expertise, provide better than normal chances for developing project 
solutions.
Owner’s participation in alliance (58) and joint development with the service providers 
supplements knowledge and allows changing design premises in case it is to the advantage of 
the project. It can be accomplished smoothly and quickly since the owner knows about the 
project’s details and the actual costs of the changes: they are based transparently on earlier 
realised costs and prices quoted by subcontractors. Thereby development work is not limited by 
preset impractical assumptions and boundary conditions guided by the customary information 
asymmetry and the resulting distrust. Presently, trust and mutual respect are important 
contributing factors and their emergence is supported e.g. by joint work and active, open 
communication which, again, are underpinned using independent, third-party estimators and 
audits. Thus, smooth collaboration is the only way service providers can eventually improve 
their bottom line.
Other drivers promoting the success of the project include the late final agreement (59) 
to be signed only after the development phase, and the related possibility of termination (60) 
of the liaison by the owner. These factors also make service providers pay attention to the 
success of the project already at the development phase. A tight project budget (61) evaluated 
by many aspirational candidates as early as the competition phase, perhaps even made tighter 
consequently, has a similar influence. Consequently, the expectation at the development 
phase is that the advantageousness of the project solution improves. On the other hand, 
during project pricing, design has already advanced far enough to allow avoiding significant 
risk contingencies through comprehensive joint risk identification and management, and 
elimination of interface risks. This naturally helps in finding an advantageous solution as do 
practical fee structures (62): the designer’s fee is generally percentage-based and that of the 
contractor (relatively) fixed, agreed already at the tender phase. Thereby the fee structure does 
not reward the contractor for expanding the project or raising the quality level, which increases 
costs (in contrast to a percentage-based fee), but as the designer’s work focusses largely on 
the development phase, said fee structure spurs investing enough in reviewing options if the 
parties otherwise jointly consider it practical; after all, design only accounts for a relatively 
small share of overall costs.
Implementation phase (Figure 4)
The implementation phase begins if, and when, the parties consider the development phase 
goal to have been fulfilled and reach agreement e.g. on the project’s target cost level. Then, 
the key factor guiding implementation is joint bearing of risks (63) which makes the objectives 
of the parties congruent as they all share e.g. in target cost over- and underruns. Along with 
target cost-based cost risk, rewarding systems related to qualitative result areas ensure the best 
possible realisation of the project’s diverse goals. The common goal guides the activity towards 
good collaboration and effective and efficient implementation for which the foundation 
has been laid by other solutions (described below). Common will gives rise to a positive 
development trend which leads to continuous improvement for the benefit of the project.
Knowledge of the introduction of joint bearing of risks at the implementation phase results 
in openness and comprehensive risk analysis and mitigation already at the development 
phase which, for its part, leads to a reduction in risk reserves and an economical solution even 
before this principle is literally in force. Conventional interface risks resulting from strict 
limits on liability have also been eliminated, and company-specific sub-optimisation typical 
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of traditional delivery methods no longer guides alliance activities. This is underpinned by 
joint organisation and work division flexibility (64) which remove barriers and make work more 
effective while improving the possibility of tending to the concerns of stakeholders.
A joint project office (65) naturally also increases interaction and makes for smoother 
co-operation while also promoting an atmosphere of trust, and helping maintain it. A joint 
leadership team (66), for its part, ensures that different views are considered in decision making, 
especially since unanimous decisions (67) are the default. The continuity of the leadership team’s 
involvement and the ensuing knowledge about project-related matters create conditions for 
quick decision making. The mechanism, considering joint bearing of cost risk, is such that all 
parties suffer from delayed decisions, meaning that it is not a traditional zero-sum game but 
supports efficient implementation. This is most obvious in the implementation phase, but these 
solutions are, in fact, in use already at the development phase to boost its realisation.
SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIME FACTORS AND PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS
The original group map, or the impact network it describes, was also subjected to quantitative 
analysis since the understanding of the overall functioning of an extensive network is 
otherwise difficult. The analysis was based on weighting of relationships as explained in the 
chapter on research methods. The results should be considered indicative since the method is 
only able to reveal order of magnitude level understanding. At this level, the results produced 
by different approaches are consistent.
Examination of the formal characteristics of the alliance (initial concepts) showed some 
carry more impact than others (by ‘top-down’ calculation). Joint bearing of risks (63) considered 
to be responsible for 20% of the success of an alliance was found most important. Another 
keystone of success is capability-based competition (54). The next key factors were related to 
the multi-sectoral, integrated organisation: early involvement of contractor (57) and owner’s 
participation in alliance (58) accounted for about 10% each of the overall impact. Joint 
organisation and work division flexibility (64) as well as joint project office (65) are nearly as 
important. The other characteristics seem to be less significant.
On the other hand, if we assess the hypothetical value creation of the alliance (by ‘bottom-
up’ calculation), the result is strongly positive with respect to all key result areas (outcome 
concepts). Especially cost-efficiency (1) and schedule (2) stand out: at least 30% of the benefit 
from using alliancing would seem to come in the form of higher cost-efficiency while schedule 
would contribute 15%. The share of other key result areas is around 10%. To be sure, the 
balancing of goals is generally some kind of a project optimisation challenge, and as such an 
issue of valuation and selection.
A path analysis of the network also provides a complementary explanation for the 
performance expectations of key result areas. A survey of the network behind each outcome 
concept (by Decision Explorer) reveals that nearly three quarters of the intermediary and 
initial concepts affect the out-turn of all (ungrouped) outcome concepts. Since the network, 
with its numerous linkages, is also complex and the chain to outcome concepts runs through 
highly general concepts, it is natural that key result areas such as the environment, quality, safety 
and traffic (4) are assigned about the same impact value.
Yet, there are differences between parts of the network behind other outcome factors. Some 
concepts may be found behind image (3) that have a stronger impact only on this key result 
area. Likewise, cost-efficiency and schedule have common background factors, which the others 
do not have, that emphasise effectiveness thinking. Moreover, impact chains and concepts 
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solely related to the outcome concept of cost-efficiency lie behind it. The initial factor possibility 
of termination (60) is not even linked to other key result areas meaning that its practical 
significance is related specifically to cost control, although the precondition for continuation 
of the project is that development phase goals are met as to all key result areas. Separately 
recognised cost- and schedule-related drivers also indicate that the favourable performance 
expectations for these result areas are well grounded and not merely based on general 
assumptions.
Discussion
REVIEW IN RELATION TO PROJECT PERFORMANCE
One aspect of verifying the conceptual model’s logic is its examination in relation to the results 
of the case study project. After all, the conceptual model gives an indication of the alliance’s 
ability to perform well which should, therefore, have been realised also in practice.
The plans produced by the alliance (Alliance Executive Team, 2013) as well as the published 
value-for-money reports (Alliance Executive Team, 2014; 2017) signal remarkable success of 
the project. First, they show that plenty of recorded development ideas were born during the 
alliance’s development phase (Alliance Executive Team, 2013), about half of which were also 
accepted for use already at that stage. The cost-benefit impacts of adopted ideas were reported 
to be 9% along with a notably shortened schedule (Alliance Executive Team, 2014) while there 
were also other innovations that were implemented mainly due to their positive value effects.
In the implementation phase, the alliance could reach the targets set at the development 
phase (Alliance Executive Team, 2017). The construction phase was speeded up further in 
a way that enabled opening the tunnel for traffic half a year earlier than anticipated in the 
schedule completed at the development phase. The out-turn cost of the original scope of works 
under-runs the target cost slightly. Safety performance was also clearly better than the industry 
average while none of the other indicators indicate inadequate performance. In other words, 
quality or other key goals have not been sacrificed to achieve savings or faster completion.
Thus, the successful realisation of the case study project gives no reason to doubt the 
authenticity of the solely positive insights of the interviewed experts about the impact of 
alliancing on project performance. On the other hand, public image and usability related key 
performance indicators still need to be monitored after substantial completion and opening for 
traffic (reached at the time of finalising this study/paper).
The innovation processes and development phase results of the case study project have 
been reviewed also in a parallel study (Lahdenperä, 2016) where practical experts assessed 
the alliance’s performance in relation to other delivery methods (Design-Build, Design-Bid-
Build, Construction Management). Regarding alliancing, experts emphasised its great ability 
to generate innovations that are a key to high economic efficiency. On the other hand, the 
development of a project solution is much more difficult when using the alternative delivery 
methods where the business logic and the competitive arrangements do little to support the 
presentation of ideas. All in all, the result was that an alliance creates the preconditions for 
achieving the highest economic efficiency particularly in demanding projects.
REVIEW IN RELATION TO CURRENT KNOWLEDGE
Existing literature offers another way of reviewing the work done. Literature has dealt widely 
with the alliance approach on a general level. Yet, the material is fragmented and reviewing 
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it all would be too random and speculative since comparable studies do not exist. Thus, this 
study concentrates on sources giving a comprehensive, condensed and unambiguous view 
of the principles of alliancing. Considering the development of procedures and increased 
understanding over time, the focus should be on recent publications. Accordingly, works by 
Walker and Lloyd-Walker (2015), Chen and Manley (2014), Chen et al. (2012) and DIRD 
(2015) take centre stage. All of them present an itemised list of the alliance’s properties (nearly 
50 in all) while many of the listed items have the same meaning despite being expressed 
differently in different publications. The study went through all these items one by one (cf. 
Lahdenperä, 2015a) even though only a summary of the review focussing on the differences is 
presented here.
Most of the listed formal properties of the alliance organisation or process are initial 
concepts of this study. Moreover, some intermediary concepts of the impact map/model – 
cost transparency (26), selection-phase workshops (41) and maintenance of collaborative and team 
spirit (38) – are in line with the transparency and open book documentation and reporting 
principles (DIRD, 2015; Chen et al., 2012; Walker and Lloyd-Walker, 2015) and team 
workshops (Chen and Manley, 2014). Thus, all literature items on formal practice are included 
with one exception: issues such as commitment to no disputes and no blame culture (Chen 
et al., 2012; Walker and Lloyd-Walker, 2015; DIRD, 2015) are included in the concepts of 
the model in substance, but the fact that the parties agree to resolve all conflicts and disputes 
internally and not to litigate (Chen et al., 2012; DIRD, 2015) is missing from the developed 
model. To be sure, all these things, even refraining from legal action (except in cases of 
intentional damage and gross negligence) are emphasised also in the agreements of the case 
project (FTA, 2012a; 2012c) although the absence of the latter from the discussion about a 
development-oriented process and its functioning is as such natural. It should be further noted 
that literature distinguishes incentives related to cost-effectiveness and other key result areas 
just like the interviews of the study and the model’s explanations although the formal concept 
map does not.
All the informal elements listed by the publications describing the character of the activity 
also appear in the map, at least in the background definitions of concepts (interviews), 
although these are by nature more broad-based issues subject to several interpretations and 
are difficult to define in unambiguous terms. In this regard, we are talking about the map’s 
intermediary concepts which is consistent with the observation by Chen and Manley (2014): 
based on the path analyses they conducted, informal factors serve as mediators in the impact 
mechanisms of formal factors, basically between initial concepts and outcome concepts. They 
also stated (based on 320 questionnaire responses) that all listed factors contribute to an 
improved performance level. Thus, the study also supports the interpretation that the factors 
presented in this study are specifically ones that promote value creation.
A comparison in the opposite direction brings up a few initial factors of the concept 
map that are not emphasised in the reference material. The consortium selection (i.e. team 
formation by service providers themselves (55) and the related possibility of team optimisation) 
was identified as a key driver of good-value creation. The guidelines and examples lean toward 
the use of consortium selection (DTF, 2006; DIRD, 2015, Morwood, Scott and Pitcher, 
2008) though the solution does not define alliance as the delivery method. On the other hand, 
interactive selection (56) and the ensuing possible redefinition of project scope and rules of the 
game, as well as clarification of document interpretation, were emphasised more in the study 
than the reference material. The tight project budget (61) and stage-wise nature of the alliance 
(possibility of termination (60)) also received emphasis in keeping with policies calling for 
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strong-willed leadership from the owner (Tamburro and Wood, 2014). The case study project 
also emphasised practical fee structures (62): fixed for the contractor and percentage-based for 
the designer. Although the actual reference material does not take a stand on fee structures, 
some guidelines are in line with the recommendations of the study (DTF, 2006; Morwood, 
Scott and Pitcher, 2008) and consider such practical fee structures a conventional practice.
All in all, the findings of the study are consistent with earlier studies, but contribute to 
sector knowledge by linking the various components into a coherent system.
CLOSING THE DISCUSSION
The aim of the study was to determine the means and mechanisms which affect the capacity 
of the project alliance to generate value for money. The related work was done based on the 
views of the case study project’s experts by systematically modelling them. Stage-wise personal 
interviews of experts allowed extensive mapping of impact chains without the interference 
of group dynamics, rutted thinking and unbalanced orientation affecting the results. The 
integration of individual cognitive maps produced an extensive, probably comprehensive 
group map which initially contained about 100 concepts. Streamlining of the map allowed 
highlighting essential factors without altering contents. Moreover, the relative significance of 
the basic alliance solutions exerting their influence in the background and the relative expected 
outcomes of the key result areas were also evaluated.
The result was achieved by a systematic, rigid process. The views of the interviewed experts 
were consistent and integratable. The impact model suggesting effective performance was also 
in line with the results of the case project (outcome; comparison with other delivery methods). 
These factors support the validity of the results in determining in detail the mechanisms 
that impacted the ability of alliancing to provide good value for money in the case project. 
The mechanisms of the impact model are also generally quite consistent with the big picture 
presented in literature, which means that there is no reason to harbour any major reservations 
about the results of the study.
Literature is also quite unanimous about the performance capacity of the alliance as 
suggested by the study. Therefore, the study strengthens the current theoretical view on the 
capacity of a collaborative, open process and an incentivized, integrated organization to 
provide competitive results in challenging projects by means of, for instance, certain informal 
factors that serve as mediators in the impact mechanisms of formal alliance factors. Moreover, 
the study increases our understanding of value creation mechanisms considerably as it 
describes the operating logic of the alliance in a detailed manner. Yet here we are only dealing 
with a single project which does not allow formulating a universal alliancing theory. More 
cases of diverse types in different regions with congruent results are required for generalization. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the results are based on a thorough analysis and are consistent with 
project performance and literature indicates that the model could serve as a basis for creating 
such a theory, which suggests that it would be worthwhile running further tests.
Thus, by providing the conceptual model, the study contributes to the knowledge about 
alliancing and potentially also lays the foundation for a more formal project alliance theory 
by explaining the capability of alliancing to produce value for money. The novelty value of 
the model lies primarily in that it connects the basic features, procedures and performance 
expectations of alliancing closely together, resulting in a comprehensive and coherent system 
description. No such specification of the alliance’s operating logic is known to have been made 
since the subject has been mainly addressed at the level of individual alliance principles.
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The system model emphasises the holistic nature of alliancing due to many mutually 
reinforcing interactions – the entity is more than the sum of its parts. In other words, a system 
has several parts each of which affects the behaviour of the whole, but the effect that each 
part can have overall depends on the behaviour or properties of other parts (Ackoff, 1974). 
Therefore, the performance of the system is dependent on each of its parts, and any change 
may have an extraordinary impact on the performance.
The practical implications of the work are related, firstly, to the fact that it is hard to make 
an outcome-based comparison of the performance of different project delivery systems that is 
indisputable in a world of individual projects, which is why the decision about using project 
alliancing may require more comprehensive understanding of the system’s functioning. This 
study can help in that. Secondly, projects vary a lot as they have different goals and constraints. 
The details of the alliance must also be changed sometimes: non-adherence to individual 
principles might well be practical in some instances. The owner may wish, for instance, to select 
service providers separately (instead of a complete team) or use selection geared more toward full 
price. Then, the system model can serve as a tool of planning when pondering the functioning 
of different applications deviating from the described ‘pure’ alliance.
Conclusion
Use of the alliance can contribute to the achievement of better than usual outcomes in 
case of challenging, complex projects that involve much uncertainty. The value generation 
of an alliance is based, according to the study, on the following formal solutions related to 
organisation and the process:
	 •	 capability-based	competition	(54)
	 •	 team	formation	by	service	providers	themselves	(55)
	 •	 interactive	selection	(56)
	 •	 selection-phase	workshops	(41)
	 •	 early	involvement	of	contractor	(57)
	 •	 owner’s	participation	in	alliance	(58)
	 •	 cost	transparency	(26)
	 •	 late	final	agreement	(59)
	 •	 possibility	of	termination	(60)
	 •	 tight	project	budget	(61)
	 •	 practical	fee	structures	(62)
	 	 •	 contractor’s	fixed	fee
	 	 •	 designer’s	percentage-based	fee
	 •	 joint	bearing	of	risks	(63)
	 	 •	 target	cost-based	contract
	 	 •	 incentive	scheme	for	qualitative	result	areas
	 •	 joint	organisation	and	work	division	flexibility	(64)
	 •	 joint	project	office	(65)
	 •	 joint	leadership	team	(66)
	 •	 unanimous	decisions	(67),	and
	 •	 refraining	from	legal	action.
These factors are, with a few exceptions, initial concepts of the system model produced by 
the study (concepts represented by green ovals in Figs. 2-4). Selection-phase workshops and cost 
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transparency are, however, shown in the model as so-called (yellow) intermediary concepts, 
although they also are essential formal alliance solutions. The same applies to the principle 
of refraining from legal action though it was not raised at all when the model was being put 
together. The last two principles remind us about some other underlying precautions used 
in alliancing: financial audits, third party estimate reviews, etc. They may not improve the 
performance directly, but as a result, the option of wheeling and dealing is eliminated and 
successful implementation of the entire project is the only way for service providers to improve 
their bottom line. This is where the other listed formal solutions enter the picture to actively 
boost performance.
Accordingly, these formal (hard) process solutions should and will be complemented by 
other (softer) operational principles: innovation driven, committed, open and sincere co-
operation are important for the success of an alliance project. In fact, the above formal factors 
are implemented to create common goals and interest in co-operation for the parties which 
supports the realisation of these softer principles (appearing as intermediary concepts in the 
model).
All in all, the basic idea of alliancing is to make it in the best interest of all parties to solve 
problems and develop the project, which is supported by the model’s many parallel basic 
solutions synergistically and comprehensively. Thus, the pure alliance described by the system 
model provides a greater boost to the implementation of a project than the sum of its parts, 
and deviation from the presented principles, just in the case of an individual principle, poses 
some risk.
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